On Virtue and Villains

I'm not sure how to categorize this, other than I believe it's central to my philosophy on both writing and gaming and entertainment overall, which is a reflection of reality. Here, I'm utilizing some elements from a blog post by Alexander Macris to discuss the philosophy, because I like the categorizations that he makes.

But first, I'm quoting a section of the first chapter of On Virtue, a 1981 book by Alasdair McIntyre and his rather disquieting observation about society of the time. While it seemed disquieting at the time, it's much more obviously true now, thirty years after he first wrote it. Macris also referred specifically to this passage.

Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed. Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. Later still there is a reaction against this destructive movement and enlightened people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was. But all that they possess are fragments: a knowledge of experiments detached from any knowledge of the theoretical context which gave them significance; parts of theories unrelated either to the other bits and pieces of theory which they possess or to experiment; instruments whose use has been forgotten; half-chapters from books, single pages from articles, not always fully legible because they're torn and charred. 

Nonetheless all these fragments are reembodied in a set of practices which go under the revived names of physics, chemistry and biology. Adults argue with each other about the respective merits of relativity theory, evolutionary theory and phlogiston theory, although they possess only a very partial knowledge of each. Children learn by heart the surviving portions of the periodic table and recite as incantations some of the theorems of Euclid. Nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all. For everything that they do and say conforms to certain canons of consistency and coherence and those contexts which would be needed to make sense of what they are doing have been lost, perhaps irretrievably. 

In such a culture men would use expressions such as ‘neutrino’, ‘mass’, ‘specific gravity’, ‘atomic weight’ in systematic and often interrelated ways which would resemble in lesser or greater degrees the ways in which such expressions had been used in earlier times before scientific knowledge had been so largely lost. But many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these expressions would have been lost and there would appear to be an element of arbitrariness and even of choice in their application which would appear very surprising to us. What would appear to be rival and competing premises for which no further argument could be given would abound. Subjectivist theories of science would appear and would be criticized by those who held that the notion of truth embodied in what they took to be science was incompatible with subjectivism. 

This imaginary possible world is very like one that some science fiction writers have constructed. We may describe it as a world in which the language of natural science, or parts of it at least, continues to be used but is in a grave state of disorder. We may notice that if in this imaginary world analytical philosophy were to flourish, it would never reveal the fact of this disorder. For the techniques of analytical philosophy are essentially descriptive and descriptive of the language of the present at that. The analytical philosopher would be able to elucidate the conceptual structures of what was taken to be scientific thinking and discourse in the imaginary world in precisely the way that he elucidates the conceptual structures of natural science as it is. 

Nor again would phenomenology or existentialism be able to discern anything wrong. All the structures of intentionality would be what they are now. The task of supplying an epistemological basis for these false simulacra of natural science would not differ in phenomenological terms from the task as it is presently envisaged. A Husserl or a Merleau-Ponty would be as deceived as a Strawson or a Quine. 

What is the point of constructing this imaginary world inhabited by fictitious pseudo-scientists and real, genuine philosophy? The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have — very largely, if not entirely — lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, or morality. 

But how could this be so? The impulse to reject the whole suggestion out of hand will certainly be very strong. Our capacity to use moral language, to be guided by moral reasoning, to define our transactions with others in moral terms is so central to our view of ourselves that even to envisage the possibility of our radical incapacity in these respects is to ask for a shift in our view of what we are and do which is going to be difficult to achieve. 

McIntyre is both right and yet not right. We have lost that comprehension as a society. But the knowledge isn't lost and fragmented and otherwise unable to be recovered, it's just not utilized. The culprit is the abandonment of Christianity by our people (even many of those who still call themselves Christians... but that's a topic for another day) and the embrace of situational, worldly ethics designed to make us feel good about ourselves regardless of what we choose to do and believe; regardless of its rightness or wrongness. But the knowledge isn't lost, just abandoned by the majority. It's still there, and can be readily pieced together if people were willing to humble themselves sufficiently to acknowledge the Hand of God and look at it again. Like the brazen serpent Moses held aloft to cure the children of Israel from the bites of the fiery serpents, it's relatively easy to repair our understanding of morality. But many will outright refuse to look and will perish in their pride.

For some independent confirmation, Paul described to Timothy the same conditions, and prophesied that they would reign in the last days: "This know also, that in the last days perilous times shall come. For men shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, Without natural affection, trucebreakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good, Traitors, heady, highminded, lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God; Having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof: from such turn away. For of this sort are they which creep into houses, and lead captive silly women laden with sins, led away with divers lusts, Ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." And Isaiah was even more blunt and succinct: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter! Woe unto them that are wise in their own eyes, and prudent in their own sight! [...] Which justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him!"

Because of this loss of understanding of actual morality, Macris argues, we have four general categories of villains in our works of entertainment, and the older types conform to a society that understands morality. The newer types, or at least the newest type, does not. It's not that such a villain isn't actually a villain or that such characterizations don't exist in real life, because they do. Although as you will no doubt have seen over and over again in modern entertainment, the sympathy that we're supposed to have for the villain, who becomes philosophically converged to the anti-hero or even in many cases the so-called hero, is his defining trait as a character. The merging of heroism and villainy into a kind of sorta nobody is really either is the defining trait of works of entertainment that over-utilize this type of villain.

The categories and some of the examples used to illustrate them are, therefore, from Macris (I believe; he doesn't attribute them to anyone else, anyhow) but the discussion around them is my own.

Ancient Villain (The Destroyer): This can perhaps be best described as pre-Christian pagan villains. Villains here are synonymous with chaos, and they are typified with wanting to destroy order. The iconic example, although most ancient societies have analogs, are the struggles of the Olympians known as the Titanomachy and the Gigantomachy. Typhon and Echidna are the most iconic examples, because they just raged against order and wanted to tear it down because they hated it. They didn't want to rule. They didn't want to build something else. They just wanted to watch the world burn, and had no plans to replace it with anything else.

Although the category name is "ancient" and ancient works of literature often depict this kind of villain, it's hardly something that has left us. If the Medieval villain template is Satan himself, then the ancient villain template is also an aspect of him. In works that expand on the narrative of Genesis chapter 3, we learn that Satan, when called out by God in the Garden of Eden, is angered and declares that if the children of Adam and Eve will not consent to be ruled by him, then he will destroy them out of spite. God promises that he indeed will have some such power; he will be able to bruise the heel, but through the Atonement of Jesus Christ, ultimately Satan will fail, and have his head crushed. 

Heath Ledger's Joker is one such villain. There isn't any reason for his sadism, he just wants to watch the world burn. We're given numerous explanations for how he got to where he is, but we gradually come to realize that every explanation that the Joker gives is just him just yanking our chains and he's making them all up to amuse himself. 

This attitude of villainy is still very much with us today. Radical Marxists, anti-racists, feminists, and more are defined in many ways not by how they've been victims of anything other than their own evil; they have nothing but spite, envy and covetousness for more successful and happy people than themselves. Lacking any way to get what they want that they are willing to pursue (i.e. humility, repentance and acceptance that they're not entitled to whatever they want), they turn to spite and pettiness and just want to burn everything down. It's not hard to see a visceral, inexplicable hatred of Western Civilization in the eyes of most liberal philosophy that has no desire other than to burn it all to the ground, dispossess the children of Western Civilization of their inheritance, their peace, their happiness, for no other reason than to satisfy the nihilistic narcissism of the Ancient Villain for a brief moment. 

In this way, the ancient villain isn't just necessarily a ravening monster who despises order and justice because he exists outside of it. Sometimes the ancient villain understands it and yet rejects it and it turns his attitude into one of pure nihilistic spite.

Medieval Villain (The Rebel): The Medieval villain is a bit more subtle. Satan is again the template, but many Medieval characters fit the archetype quite well. Mordred, for example, the bastard son of King Arthur, is one such. Morgoth (and Sauron too) from the works of Tolkien, who greatly admired the Medievalist tradition, is another. The Medieval villain is one that requires Christianity to evolve out of the idea of the Ancient Villain. Whereas the pagans of Europe and the Middle East could easily conceive of an ancient villain who wanted merely to destroy order, it was Christianity that introduced (or reintroduced) to them the concept of the corrupter. The one who doesn't want to destroy the natural order, but rather wants to rule it and remake it in his own image, with him at the head replacing the heads of the current order. Satan wanted to take the place of God himself, to remake creation in his own image, to set himself up as the ruler. When this was rejected, he rebelled and became both the medieval and ancient villain at the same time, depending on circumstances. Those whom he could corrupt, he did. Those he could not, he sought to destroy. The fatal flaw of the Medieval villain isn't his undying rage or spite, but rather his undying pride and arrogance. He knows that he's rebelling against an order that is good, but he doesn't care. As the Satanic saying goes, as put forward by Milton, "better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven" or "Non serviam" is the watchword of the Medieval villain.

Modern Villain (The Manager): The modern villain is characterized by the banal, bureaucratic nature of his villainy. Often the modern villain doesn't necessarily believe that he's a villain. He just doesn't care about the morality of his actions in pursuit of his goals. He's the perfect example of the expression that you can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs. If "breaking a few eggs" evolves into "burning down the entire chicken farm" that doesn't make him evolve into an Ancient Villain unless his motivation for doing so evolves as well; it's just a case of what's already there going out of control like a runaway train.

Other times, the modern villain can be sadistic and moustache-twirling, but as merely an agent or bureaucrat of a malign system which he serves. Macris gives the example of Grand Moff Tarkin from the first Star Wars movie here; the Empire is a villainous, malign system, and Tarkin is the agent of it. He has no compunctions against destroying an entire planet to make a statement to the rest of the galaxy. It's just the cost of doing business. But he had no particular malign intent towards the Alderaanians. Destroying them was just a convenient tool to accomplish his designs.

Post-Modern Villain (The Victim): The post-modern villain is the most common in entertainment today. I dislike this villain, because it gives the villain an excuse and tries to remake the villain into a sympathetic, non-villain. That said, there are actual villains in real life that conform to this archetype, so it's one that shouldn't be completely ignored; rather, I dislike its over-use, and specifically the idea, which is based on McIntyre's proposition that today we don't understand good and evil and have come to excuse evil and try and empathize with evil, and ultimately claim that there is no good and evil. The post-modern villain is characterized by having been victimized by an unjust, malign system which led to him becoming the character that he is. Modern or even Medieval motivated villains are remade as post-modern villains in today's entertainment. The Joker is remade as a victim in The Joker movie with Joaquin Phoenix, for example. Darth Vader is remade as a post-modern villain in the prequel trilogy. Hannibal Lector is remade as a post-modern villain in the sequel to Silence of the Lambs. Maleficent is remade in the movie titled after her character into maybe even something beyond a post-modern villain; instead of being a Medieval villain as she was in Sleeping Beauty she's now secretly the hero of the movie, and King Stephen is remade as a Medieval or even Ancient villain. (Because he's a white man.)

I should point out that while there is a place for the post-modern villain, care should be taken. An over-use of the post-modern villain tells you more about the author of the piece and his pathology than it does about the human condition. It's also a truism that many of these post-modern villains—especially if its the conversion of a popular, well-known villain of another type into a post-modern villain—doesn't go over well with the audience. They are irked by authors who try to excuse evil and make villains sympathetic or even non-villainous, in spite of their obviously evil actions. The problem with the post-modern villain is that it's subversive. It presupposes as a necessary precondition that the society in which the post-modern villain is raised is corrupt and evil.  While there's plenty of truth to that notion in today's society, the architects of post-modern villains generally get that completely wrong; what they really want to do is insult their audience by suggesting that their society is corrupt, and that they deserve the villains that they get. Of course, in reality the nihilistic society that the authors obviously favor is the corrupt one and that we the audience are the victims of their banal villainy rather than the architects of it. But who wants to admit that? Who wants to write stories in which the authors' people are the villains, and who wants to consume entertainment in which the audience's people are the villains? In my opinion this is the true root cause of the failure of wokeness to capture the minds of the people. Sure, people aren't very interesting in a lecture about how they are evil and how bratty, entitled perpetrators of hoaxes and cons like racism and sexism are heroic for having to suffer their villainy, but ultimately it's the complete lack of awareness of what good and evil even are that is the fatal flaw of those who perpetrate the post-modern villain and its many failures on our entertainment. Those who would use this trope better be really sure that they know what they are doing, and they better be sure that the are not suffering, as McIntyre suggests, from a lack of understanding of the true nature of morality.

All of that said, how has that changed how I perceive my world-building, my gaming, my writing? One obvious and maybe unexpected to my younger self result is that I've decided that Christianity is overtly the moral framework for every society that isn't outright evil. Christian morality is the objectively true morality that operates in my settings, just as it is in the real world. Another is that I'm a little wary of too much "shades of gray" storytelling. I like noir stories, crime stories, spy stories—adapted into fantasy or space opera. But I've deliberately decided that I have to be careful about these and never present evil as if it were good, or at least excusable. Evil is evil. Full stop. Even the post-modern villains are still villains. Regardless of what happened to them in the past, they chose to harden their hearts and turn to evil because of it, and they could have chosen otherwise. Villainy is best shown when contrasted with heroism. The post-modern villain's villainy is more compelling and true when we're also shown someone who suffered the same injustice that the villain uses as his excuse, but who choose otherwise—restraint, forgiveness, letting go of anger and bitterness, etc. Trying the justify and rehabilitate the image of villains by making them not really villains (especially when the same is done in parallel to the heroes) just turns everyone into a stupid gray mush. Like I said earlier, it says more about the author than the author—I think—really wants to reveal, because it isn't flattering.